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887 
The Rhetoric of Anti-Relativism 
in a Culture of Certainty 
HOWARD LESNICK† 
 
[THE DUKE OF] NORFOLK (Walks away and turns ) All right—
we‟re at war with the Pope! The Pope‟s a Prince, isn‟t he?  
 
[SIR THOMAS] MORE He is. 
 
NORFOLK And a bad one? 
 
MORE Bad enough. But the theory is that he‟s also the Vicar of 
God, the descendant of St. Peter, our only link with Christ.  
 
NORFOLK (Sneering) A tenuous link.  
 
MORE Oh, tenuous indeed. 
 
NORFOLK (To the others) Does this make sense? . . . You‟ll forfeit 
all you‟ve got—which includes the respect of your country—for a 
theory? 
 
MORE (Hotly) The Apostolic Succession of the Pope is (Stops;  
interested) . . . Why, it‟s a theory, yes; you can‟t see it; can‟t touch 
it; it‟s a theory. . . . But what matters to me is not whether it‟s true 
or not but that I believe it to be true, or rather, not that I believe 
it, but that I believe it . . . . 
Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons1 
 
 
† Jefferson B. Fordham Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. This 
Essay had its genesis in a paper prepared for a conference on “Law and 
Democracy in the Empire of Force,” held at the University of Michigan Law 
School in April 2007. I thank Professors James Boyd White, of Michigan, and H. 
Jefferson Powell, of Duke University, Law Schools, for inviting me to 
participate and for very helpful comments on the paper. I also acknowledge, 
with thanks, the insights of Professors Edward A. Hartnett, of Seton Hall, and 
Amelia J. Uelmen, of Fordham University, Law Schools. 
1. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 91 (1990). 
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Nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another 
belief. 
Donald Davidson2 
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INTRODUCTION 
The unholy trinity of much public discourse today is 
Liberalism, Secularism, and Relativism. Like a (very small) 
deck of cards, they are often thought to support one 
another, to engender one another, at times allowed even to 
stand in for one another semantically. Whether as three or 
as one, they are widely viewed as the root cause of much of 
our social malaise. 
Let me start with expressions of the evils of the first 
two “isms,” chosen almost at random: 
Liberalism . . . seems unable to arrest the barbarism of modern 
culture; indeed, contemporary liberalism is impl icated in many of 
the most corrosive moral and intellectual trends of our time.3 
 
 
2. DONALD DAVIDSON, A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge, in 
SUBJE CTIVE, INTERS UBJECTIVE, OBJECTIVE 137, 141 (2001). 
3. Matthew Berke, A Jewish Appreciation of Catholic Social Teaching, in 
CATHOLICISM, LI BERALISM, AND COMMUNITARI ANISM: THE CATHOLI C 
INTELLECTUAL TRADITION AND THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRACY 235, 237 
(Kenneth L. Grasso et al. eds.,1995). 
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The general climate of society . . . shows a radical loss of the sense 
of the transcendent, a devaluation of the religious dimension of 
human experience, and a great disregard for spiritual values. As a 
consequence of this general social impoverishment caused by 
secularism, life both personal and social is more and more guided 
by practical atheism, which leaves unchecked the worst human 
tendencies and thus delivers people to the other great vices of 
these societies: individualism, utilitarianism, hedonism, materialism, 
and consumerism.4 
I find sadly apt the description of our culture as 
“corrosive,” in some ways even “barbaric,” and as widely 
characterized by “individualism, utilitarianism, hedonism, 
materialism, and consumerism.”5 I also deeply deplore the 
“radical loss of the sense of the transcendent”6 in 
contemporary society. I find seriously problematic, however, 
the tendentious attribution of such social evils to the 
influence of relativism, liberalism, and secularism, 
especially because it serves to obscure the fact that the 
political outlook of many of the severest critics of liberalism 
and secularism often legitimates that very catalogue of 
social ills. 
To me, the terms liberalism and secularism are too 
protean for words, and I will not address their 
responsibility for prevalent social evils. I offer instead a 
critique of anti-relativism. 
I. ANTI-RELATIVISM 
I confess at the outset that my claim will in no way be 
new; indeed, were it not for anti-relativism‟s robust 
popularity, my objection to its rhetoric could justly be 
viewed as banal. But almost any day one can find published 
efforts to claim warrant for a set of moral positions by 
standing firm against relativism. 
The truth of a moral claim cannot be established by an 
objection to relativism.7 At best, the objection can succeed 
 
4. HERMINIO RICO , JOHN PAUL II AND THE LEGACY OF DI GNITATIS HUMANAE 
205 (2002) (attributing this view to Pope John Paul II).  
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. In this claim, I am following Clifford Geertz, who, in coining (so far as I 
am aware) the term, “anti anti-relativism,” called anti-relativism “an antique 
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(if it is not merely declaimed) in establishing that such a 
claim may have “truth value,” that its truth is not “only a 
feeling” or “just a matter of opinion,” but it does not begin to 
address the question whether the proposition posited or 
asserted correctly expresses the truth of the matter. Indeed, 
it is only because I reject relativism, as I do, that I can 
contend that the widespread use of the charge of relativism 
to allow one to avoid engaging with claims to a different 
“knowledge” of the truth regarding a moral issue is not 
simply annoying but wrongful; a form of rhetorical 
immorality, if you will. The wrong is compounded when, as 
too often is the case, the charge sweeps all whose moral 
sensibilities differ into the same derisively labeled trash 
pail, and compounded further when defense of a position on 
anti-relativist grounds is bound up with a repellant 
indifference to the human suffering the position casually 
overlooks or seeks to justify. 
The anti-relativist might object at the outset that I am 
misconceiving the claim. It is not a specific moral position—
a single ethical assertion, say, divorce is a wrongful act 
(whether always or only in specified circumstances)—that 
one is seeking to support (in the example, by attacking a 
defense of the moral standing of divorce) as based on 
relativism. That claim might well be termed a category 
mistake, supporting a challenged ethical contention with a 
meta-ethical one. The relevant claim, this contention 
maintains, is rather that what might be termed a “culture 
of relativism” in contemporary society creates a generalized 
aura of lassitude about the truth of many moral scruples, 
such that people come to take a “live and let live” attitude 
toward a whole range of conduct previously thought 
freighted with (negative) moral significance. That fog 
dispelled, the immorality of such conduct once again will 
appear plain. 
The claim so articulated begs the question, however, of 
the moral status of the panoply of “moral scruples” that 
previously reigned unchallenged. The critique is often based 
not on lassitude, but on an assertedly long overdue 
emergence of a more penetrating morality, recognizing and 
 
mistake.” Clifford Geertz, Anti Anti-relativism, 86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST  263 
(1984), reprinted in RELATIVISM: INTE RPRETATION AND CONFRONTATI ON 12, 12 
(Michael Krausz ed.,1989). With Geertz, my effort is “to counter a view rather 
than to defend the view it claims to be counter to.” Id. at 12. 
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seeking to work free of the pervasive immorality of 
(formerly) prevailing moral norms. To stay with the 
example, it is not divorce but rather imprisoning people 
(usually women) in oppressive marriages that is wrongful. 
Expressing the emancipatory claim in relativist terms is 
indeed at times an unfortunate way of making what is in 
truth a profoundly content-laden moral objection.8 But the 
counter-charge against “relativism” is nonetheless a device 
to reaffirm the traditional moral position without needing 
to engage seriously with the morality-grounded concerns of 
its critics. That it may succeed in diverting attention from 
the need for such an engagement is hardly a defense. 
Whether the conflict in moral norms is posed as a 
matter of the general cultural environment or of specific 
moral questions, my contention is that the issue is evaded 
by framing it as the infirmity of relativism. 
Objecting to the misuse of questioning the soundness of 
relativism does not of course warrant ruling objections to 
relativism out of bounds, and I will say why I do reject it as 
a meta-ethical stance. The focus on relativism is a 
distraction from recognition of the significance of conflicts 
in justified beliefs about a moral question; what is 
condemned as a “culture of relativism” may in fact be (less 
ringingly) a “culture of conflicting justified beliefs,” 
concededly complicating our moral environment, but all 
things considered constituting an enrichment, or at the 
least a potential enrichment, of it. 
II. RELATIVISM 
The primary question I will consider has arisen in 
settings as inconspicuous as was Geertz‟s venue—the 1983 
annual meeting of the American Anthropologists 
Association—and as unprecedentedly public as was the 
prelude to the 2005 Conclave of the Roman Catholic College 
of Cardinals, where in his last published statement prior to 
being elected Pope, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, with a very 
large percentage of the people of the world attending 
closely, condemned a perceived “dictatorship of relativism”: 
 
8. “The claim that moral laws are unjust is inescapably a moral claim.” 
ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 
3 (1993). 
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[R]elativism, which is letting oneself be tossed and “swept along by 
every wind of teaching,” looks like the only attitude up to today‟s 
standards. We are moving toward a dictatorship of relativism that 
does not recognize anything as certain and has as its highest goal 
one‟s own ego and one‟s own desires.9 
In somewhat more than twenty years Geertz‟s “anti 
anti-relativism” has garnered approximately 500 Google 
entries; in slightly more than twenty months Pope 
Benedict‟s “dictatorship of relativism” some 50,000.10 But 
that disparity has no evaluative import, in either direction. 
Geertz devoted much of his critique to a demonstration 
of the rhetorical excesses of anti-relativists in 
anthropology.11 I prefer to look here at the target of the 
firing squad, and its appropriateness as a target, rather 
than at the ammunition used to dispatch it. What is 
“relativism”? There is of course a variousness in the beliefs 
of self-described relativists, but it will serve for present 
purposes to note two variants. The first, emphasizing what 
morality is thought to be relative to, is well summarized by 
Judge Richard Posner: 
[T]here are no interesting moral universals. There are tautological 
ones, such as “murder is wrong” where “murder” means “wrongful 
killing” . . . . But what counts as murder . . . varies enormously 
from society to society. There are a handful of rudimentary 
principles of social cooperation . . . that may be common to all 
human societies . . . . But they are too abstract to be criterial. 
Meaningful moral realism is therefore out, and a form (not every 
form) of moral relativism is in. Relativism in turn invites an 
adaptationist conception of morality, in which morality is judged—
nonmorally, in the way that a hammer might be judged well or 
 
9. Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Future Pope‟s Homily for Conclave‟s Opening, 
34 ORIGINS 720 (2005). The quoted passage is from the Letter to the Ephesians 
4:14. A slightly different translation appears in the official text: 
[L]etting oneself be “tossed here and there, carried about by every wind 
of doctrine,” seems the only attitude that can cope with modern times. 
We are building a dictatorship of relativism that does not recognize 
anything as definitive and whose ultimate goal consists solely of one's 
own ego and desires. 
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Mass Pro Eligendo Romano Pontifice (Apr. 18, 2005), 
http://www.vatican.va/gpII/documents/homily-pro-eligendo-pontifice_20050418_ 
en.html. 
10. As of April 1, 2007. 
11. Geertz, supra note 7, at 15-17. 
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poorly adapted to its goal of hammering nails into wood or 
plaster—by its contribution to the survival, or other ultimate 
goals, of a society or some group within it . . . . [M]oral progress is 
in the eye of the beholder. 12 
This approach sees morality as a matter of convention 
and function, a description of social practices and utilities, 
lacking any basis for noninstrumental evaluation. A 
stronger version of relativism as to morality asserts that, 
when one says that a certain practice is “wrong” (or “right,” 
in the moral sense; “immoral” or “moral”), he or she can 
only be telling you something about the speaker. Morality, 
David Hume asserted, “is more properly felt than judg‟d 
of.”13 To a relativist (Hume was not), the feeling cannot be 
evidence of a truth existing independently of it, to which it 
points, because there is no “truth to which it points”; there 
exists only a “taste,” “preference,” or condemnatory practice 
of the evaluator. On this view, as my former colleague, 
Michael Moore, put it: “[T]he only thing to be said about 
watermelons or concentration camps is that some people 
like them and some people don‟t.”14 
Moore‟s bon mot has to be understood in context. Of 
course, it is not literally the “only” thing a relativist 
(professed or otherwise) would say. Richard Rorty, for 
example, although he urges us to “give up the idea that the 
point of discourse is to represent reality accurately,”15 
would unquestionably not be neutral in his judgment of 
concentration camps.16 What a relativist would not do is 
ground a negative judgment about concentration camps in a 
commitment to a “mind-independent” truth. 
 
12. RICHARD A. POSNE R, THE PROBLEM ATI CS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 6 
(1999) (citation omitted). 
13. DAVID HUME, A TRE ATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 470 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 
1986). 
14. Michael Moore, Moral Reality , 1982 WIS. L. REV. 1061, 1064. 
15. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCI AL HOPE 85-86 (1999). “„[M]oral 
progress‟ is at least in part a matter of increasing moral knowledge . . . about 
something independent of our social practices . . . .” Id. at 84. While regarding 
the term as an “epithet,” he acknowledges that his views fit his own conception 
of a relativist: “of course we pragmatists never call ourselves relativists.” Id. at 
xvi. 
16. See his endorsement of Judith Shklar‟s famous definition of a liberal as 
one who believes that “cruelty is the worst thing we do.” RICHARD RORTY, 
CONTINGE NCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY, at xv (1989). 
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Moore‟s and Ratzinger‟s statements have in common a 
critical stance toward relativism—and a tendency to 
describe it in ways that maximize its unacceptability to a 
reader or listener. It is necessary to be careful about taking 
the content or meaning of a disputed way of thinking from 
one who is opposed to it. Ratzinger‟s “definition” of 
relativism is pure invective; few if any relativists think that 
all positions are equal, or regard “one‟s own desires” as 
unquestionable; it is only that one‟s values or goals cannot 
be evaluated by an external standard of truth, for no such 
external standard exists. Whether that is a distinction 
without a difference is a fair question, which I will address 
in context; the answer should not, however, be taken for 
granted. 
It is also necessary to try to untangle the relation 
between relativism and secular thinking, and between 
relativism and liberalism, describing those relations 
unaffected by any presumptive condemnation or embrace of 
any of them. I will begin with relativism and secularism. 
III. RELATIVISM AND SECULARISM 
It has often been observed that all secular philosophies 
since Descartes begin in doubt; therefore in one sense they 
do not (in Cardinal Ratzinger‟s words) “recognize anything 
as certain.”17 
The official English text also renders his words as, 
“every wind of doctrine,” referring to relativism as “the only 
attitude that can cope with modern times.”18 This is a 
significantly more cautious statement than “„every wind of 
teaching‟, [which] looks like the only attitude up to today‟s 
standards.”19 Although the modification obviously intended 
to retain a pejorative cast, were the statement regretful 
rather than militant I would readily agree that relativism 
often “seems the only doctrine that can cope with modern 
times.” Religions begin in faith, their adherents often 
 
17. Ratzinger, Future Pope‟s Homily for Conclave‟s Opening, supra note 9, at 
720. The official English text uses the word, “definitive,” rather than “certain,” 
evidencing a careful attention to nuance and toning the statement down a bit. 
See Ratzinger, Mass Pro Eligendo Romano Pontifice, supra note 9, at 2. 
18. Ratzinger, Mass Pro Eligendo Romano Pontifice, supra note 9, at 2. 
19. Ratzinger, Future Pope‟s Homily for Conclave‟s Opening, supra note 9, at 
720. 
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committing themselves to positing the truth of specific 
(albeit often differing) premises.20 Yet, as Arthur Leff 
pointed out a generation ago,21 most secular philosophies 
soon coast along with grounding premises that, if not held 
with certainty, are deemed “proven” by the rhetorical device 
of positing assignment of the burden of proof to an 
unprovable “contradictory value.”22 For their part, 
relativists too accept the “truth” of specific propositions as 
working hypotheses, rationally (if only provisionally) 
grounding action.23 
A tight nexus between relativist and secular thought 
has been propounded in three different ways; the first two 
seek to protect religious belief by condemning relativism, 
the third, proceeding from a critical stance toward religion, 
seeks to protect relativism by claiming that non-relativist 
thinking is essentially religious. As usually stated, all are 
fallacious, in my judgment. 
 
20. This is not the only way in which religion is primarily understood. 
However, it is the sense most widely encountered, and the one most relevant to 
the present discussion. For one presentation of a common taxonomy of what, to 
people thinking of themselves as religious, religion is primarily about, see 
GEORGE A. LI NDBECK, THE NATURE OF DOCTRINE: RELIGION AND THEOLOGY I N A 
POSTLIBE RAL AGE (1984). Lindbeck classifies the several conceptions of religion 
as “cognitively propositional,” primarily involving “informative propositions or 
truth claims about objective realities”; “experiential-expressive,” described as 
“noninformative and nondiscursive symbols of inner feelings, attitudes , or 
existential orientations”; and “cultural-linguistic,” which are “communally 
authoritative rules of discourse, attitude, and action.” Id. at 16-18. 
21. Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law , 1979 DUKE L. J. 
1229. 
22. See id. at 1240. Also, as Leff notes: 
If a series of values is set forth to be justified—“proved” in the strong 
sense . . . all attempts will necessarily fail. On the other hand, if the set 
includes a value that is to prevail unless some other contradictory 
value is “proved,” then the value not requiring proof will always win. 
Id. 
23. John Dewey put the matter clearly: 
If inquiry begins in doubt, it terminates in the institution of conditions 
which remove need for doubt . . . . This settled condition is a 
demarcating characteristic of genuine belief. . . . [Yet] [t]he 
“settlement” of a particular situation . . . is no guarantee that that 
settled conclusion will always remain settled. . . . [T]here is no belief so 
settled as not to be exposed to further inquiry. 
JOHN DEWEY, LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY 7-8 (1938). 
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A.  Acceptance of (Some Set of) Religious Beliefs is the Only 
Safeguard Against Relativist Thinking 
As Dostoevsky‟s Ivan Karamazov famously put it: 
“Without God . . . everything is permitted.”24 The most one 
can charitably say about this claim is that it is somewhat 
understandable: One who does not have a secular 
consciousness might well imagine that one who does will 
tend to doubt the claim of moral reality, and will therefore 
lack any basis for denying the “permissibility” of any act. 
Ivan‟s fear is widely shared, and not to be sneered at. 
However, the generalization is infirm both logically and 
empirically. Many who reject theistic metaphysics honestly 
hold, and can respectably defend, a belief in the existence 
and discernment of moral truth, transcending personal or 
cultural boundaries. More fundamentally, those not holding 
such a belief almost never deem everything “permitted,” 
albeit they are using the word in a sense that does not posit 
an external source of constraint.25 That both sorts of 
 
24. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHE RS KARAMAZOV  589 (N. Point Press 
1990). 
25. Reference to philosophers as different as Michael Moore and Martha 
Nussbaum suffices to establish the truth of these two sentences. Regarding 
Moore, see Michael S. Moore, Good Without God, in NATURAL LAW , 
LIBE RALISM, AND MORALITY 221, 260 (Robert P. George ed., 1996) (concluding 
that “God does no work at all” in grounding the “objectivity of morals.”) . 
Martha Nussbaum, writing of “ethical standards that are independent of the 
norms and traditions of a particular culture,”  maintains that such a non -
relativist conception “does not mean that justice and equality and personhood 
are supposed to be extra-human and ahistorical standards. For some 
philosophers  who talk this way (e.g. Plato) they are; for others (Socrates, 
Aristotle, Kant, Mill) . . . they are not.” Martha C. Nussbaum, Valuing Values: 
A Case for Reasoned Commitment, 6 YALE J.L. & HUM AN. 197, 214 (1994). 
 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66, 173 (1965), gave powerful 
recognition to the existence and salience of binding moral scruples not 
grounded in religious belief as that term is typically understood. Although 
eligibility for exemption from the draft on the basis of conscientious objection 
to participation in war was limited by Congress to those whose objection was 
grounded in “religious training and belief,” defined as belief in “a Supreme 
Being,” the Court deemed eligible for exemption an applicant who declared 
himself unable to avow such a belief. The Court  of Appeals held:  
When Daniel Andrew Seeger insists that he is obeying the dictates of 
his conscience or the imperatives of an absolute morality, it would 
seem impossible to say with assurance that he is not bowing to 
“external commands” in virtually the same sense as is the objector who 
defers to the will of a supernatural power. 
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skeptics may not live up to their beliefs and professions in 
no way distinguishes them from religious folks. 
Tendencies apart, as a claim of entailment the 
proposition either begs the question or is a non sequitur. 
Arthur Leff, describing God—whether “He” exists or not—
as the “unchallengeable creator of the right and the good,” 
famously claimed that, absent God, “the only available 
evaluators are people,” and no premise said to ground a 
moral position can withstand “the grand sez who.”26 It is a 
fundamental error, however, to read “challengeable” as 
“non-existent.” Anti-relativists may contend that, without 
God, all moral deliberation is a facade, rationalization 
justifying willfulness. They are flat-out wrong in this, 
however. Rationalization is an ever-present temptation, and 
belief in God hardly inoculates one against its hazards,27 for 
the question how one discerns the Will of God remains. 
“Challenge” is as common within religiously-grounded 
moral disputation as it is across the religious-secular 
divide. That the “right answer” is sometimes in dispute does 
not imply that there are no wrong answers, or that all 
contenders are of equal merit.28 
 
326 F.2d 846, 853 (2d Cir. 1964), aff‟d in part, rev‟d in part, 380 U.S. 163 
(1965). The Supreme Court agreed, finding that “the statute does not 
distinguish between externally and internally derived beliefs.” 380 U.S. at 
186. 
 Moreover, as the references to Rorty, supra notes 15-16 and accompanying 
text, make clear, even those denying the existence of any culture-independent 
moral standards nonetheless draw moral boundaries, albeit ones relative to 
culture. 
26. Leff, supra note 21, at 1230, 1233. 
27. Indeed, the very confidence of anti-relativists in the matter tempts me to 
wonder whether their confidence manifests an (understandable) desire to be 
“lashed to the mast” of a transcendental authority, lest they too lapse into 
rationalization, and thereby into error. 
28. I find Nussbaum, supra note 25, at 206-09, especially helpful on this 
point. Matthew Berke, on the other hand, falls into a polarized analysis that 
blocks his awareness of the point made in the text. “In the absence of any final 
standards,” he asserts (regarding relativism), “the individual is completely free 
to determine right and wrong for himself or herself, and to live accordingly.” 
Berke, supra note 3, at 240. Yes, in a sense; and in the presence of final 
standards, an individual is “completely free” to misperceive or misapply them. 
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B.  Relativism is Necessarily Grounded in a Secular Outlook 
on the World 
 While the previous claim presumes a rejection of (or an 
aversive reaction to) relativism in order to support 
acceptance of a religious outlook, one making this assertion 
typically presumes a rejection of secular thinking in order 
to support a rejection of relativism. Empirically, it is 
probably true that most relativists are nonreligious. Those 
who are not are likely to think of themselves as pluralists 
rather than relativists.29 To their detractors, the distinction 
is of no great importance.30 Religious pluralists, however, 
may appropriately cavil at having their mere existence 
falsified by being termed an oxymoron. There is a sense in 
which they do “relativize” their religious professions, which 
a more traditional theist honestly regards as oxymoronic. In 
doing that, however, the theist is staking a claim to a 
certain definition of “religion,” and sincerity and 
bewilderment (even anger) at having to surrender exclusive 
possession of one‟s most dearly cherished words does not 
suffice to establish title. 
C.  Belief in the Existence of the Mind-Independent Reality 
of Moral Principles is Necessarily a “Religious” Belief, 
Whether Acknowledged or Disclaimed  
This claim is ordinarily made by one who views religion 
as an inherently defective mystification, and seeks to 
support relativism as the only way to steer clear of such 
failings. It is perhaps less commonly encountered today 
than it was a few generations ago. Richard Rorty, although 
careful to distinguish the religious from the secular realist, 
regards them for this purpose as equally benighted: 
“Anybody who thinks that there are well-grounded 
theoretical answers to . . . moral dilemmas . . . is still, in his 
 
29. For example, see the essays contained in THE MYTH OF CHRISTI AN 
UNIQUENESS: TOWARD A PLURALISTIC THEOLOGY OF RELIGIONS (John Hicks & 
Paul F. Knitter eds., 1987). In particular, see Langdon Gilkey, Plurality and Its 
Theological Implications, in id. at 37, and Paul F. Knitter, Toward a Liberation 
Theology of Religions, in id. at 178, 181-90. 
30. See, e.g., CHRISTI AN UNIQUENESS RECONSIDERED : THE MYTH OF A 
PLURALISTIC THEOLOGY OF RELIGIONS (Gavin D‟Costa ed., 1990). In particular, 
see Leslie Newbigin, Religion for the Marketplace, in id. at 135, and Paul J. 
Griffiths, The Uniqueness of Christian Doctrine Defended, in id. at 157. 
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heart, a theologian or a metaphysician.”31 This usage 
presumes, a bit subliminally, the inherent incompatibility 
of claims about the nature of reality with respectable 
intellectual work.32 Ironically enough, it is similar to the 
use of the term “relativist” as an epithet, of which Rorty 
justly complains.33 In truth, the charge that secular realists 
are in fact religious is made as a rhetorical move: when 
coming from a secular relativist, it is meant to consign them 
to a world-view held in a certain amount of disdain; when 
coming from a religious anti-relativist, it serves (in a 
psychologically complex way) to undermine the legitimacy 
of a secular avowal by asserting that moral realism is no 
less a religion, which the relativist presumably looks down 
upon (although the speaker does not). 
One can, however, support a claimed connection 
between moral realism and religion without a pejorative 
cast on a quasi-definitional ground. Clifford Geertz 
describes “the heart of . . . the religious perspective” as 
“the conviction that the values one holds are grounded in 
the inherent structure of reality, that between the way one 
ought to live and the way things really are there is an 
unbreakable inner connection.”34 
A strikingly similar assertion comes, interestingly, from 
a very different thinker. Bertrand Russell wrote over a 
century ago of “the position which we have become 
accustomed to regard as specially religious, maintaining 
that, in some hidden manner, the world of fact is really 
harmonious with the world of ideals.”35 God, Russell 
asserts, is “the mystic unity of what is and what should 
 
31. RORTY, supra note 16, at xv. 
32. Michael Moore, presenting the case for the validity of the claim of moral 
realism, begins by acknowledging that the term “conjures up images of a kind of 
Aurora Borealis, but without the lights.” Moore, supra note 14, at 1062. I have 
suggested that, “when the talk is in religious terms . . . the image comes with 
lights, and the charge of mystification is that they dazzle rather than 
illuminate.” HOWARD LES NICK , LISTENI NG FOR GOD: RELIGION AND MORAL 
DISCERNMENT  53 (1998). 
33. See supra, note 15. 
34. CLIFFORD GEE RTZ, ISLAM OBSE RVED: RELIGIOUS  DEVELOPMENT IN 
MOROCCO AND INDONESIA 97 (1968). 
35. BERTRAND RUSSELL, A Free Man‟s Worship, in MYSTI CISM AND LOGIC 46, 
49 (1951). 
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be.”36 
It would not, however, be faithful to the spirit of 
Geertz‟s “inductive” approach to the problem of “defining” 
religion37 or to Russell‟s self-described skepticism38 to use 
insights such as these as a basis for ascribing a religious 
orientation to one who is fervently claiming to be a non-
believer. 
To me, the core of the matter is this: Whether secular 
thinking is in error is an ontological, not an empirical or 
pragmatic, question. To attack secularism as promoting 
relativism, or to attack relativism as grounded in 
secularism, engages with neither secular nor relativist 
thinking. Even if in the process it did not mistake the 
source (or the consequence) of a moral stance that it means 
to dispute, it would be rhetorically objectionable, for it 
displaces attention from the content of that stance. 
The truth, of course, is that both secular and relativist 
thinking share, to a substantial degree, a common cause—a 
market economy—which at the same time legitimates the 
very “individualism, utilitarianism, hedonism, materialism, 
and consumerism”39 that many anti-relativists selectively 
deplore. As Craig M. Gay, examining “The Recent 
Evangelical Debate Over Capitalism,”40 puts the matter: 
[T]he market economy has institutionalized . . . a particular kind 
 
36. Id. 
37. Geertz abjures the search for a “universal property” that “divides 
religious phenomena off from nonreligious ones with Cartesian sharpness,” in 
favor of “a set of inexact similarities, which are yet genuine similarities, [which] 
we sense to inhere in a given body of material.” GEERTZ, supra note 34, at 96-97. 
He terms this approach “a definitional procedure of a more inductive sort . . . . 
We are attempting to articulate a way of looking at the world, not to describe an 
unusual object.” Id.  
38. Russell, supra note 35, at 49-50. Additionally, 
When we have realised that Power is largely bad, that man, with his 
knowledge of good and evil, is but a helpless atom in a world which has 
no such knowledge, the choice is again presented to us: Shall we 
worship Force, or shall we worship Goodness? Shall our God exist and 
be evil, or shall he be recognised as the creation of our own conscience? 
Id. 
39. RICO, supra  note 4, at 205. 
40. This is the subtitle of his book, CRAIG M. GAY, WITH LIBE RTY AND JUSTICE 
FOR WHOM?: THE RECENT EVANGELI CAL DEBATE OVER CAPITALISM (1991). 
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of rationality. “[T]he cost-profit calculus . . . powerfully propels the 
logic of enterprise . . . rationalizing . . . man‟s tools and 
philosophies, his medical practice, his picture of the cosmos, his 
outlook on life, everything in fact including his concepts of beauty 
and justice and his spiritual ambitions.” 
 . . . . 
 . . . [M]odern secularization and decadence are not entirely 
attributable to “secular humanism.” Indeed, the nineteenth -
century cultural pattern to which many of those on the evangelical 
right would have us return—a pattern in which capitalism was 
more firmly bounded by the constraints of family, church, and 
community—was at least in part destroyed by capitalism itself. 41 
Yet, far too many self-professed anti-relativists are 
quick to defend the ethic of a market economy, directing 
their ire elsewhere.42 
 
41. Id. at 233-34 (quoting JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETE R, CAPI TALISM, SOCIALISM, 
AND DEMOCRACY 123-24 (1950)). Jeff Powell describes “[t]he accumulation of 
private possessions, the rejection of intrusive social impositions, and the 
assertion of individual autonomy” as “constitutive elements of American society 
. . . for most if not all of the nation‟s history.” H. Jefferson Powell, The Earthly 
Peace of the Liberal Republic , in CHRISTI AN PERS PECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 
71, 85 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001). He posits further that 
“American society implicitly identifies the human good with [a] comfortable, 
materialistic life . . . and is organized around the endless reproduction of that 
lifestyle for those with the means . . . .” Id. Also see the critique of the 
“dominance of the market over increasingly large domains of social and cultural 
life” in David Hollenbach, Afterword: A Community of Freedom, in CATHOLICISM 
AND LIBE RALISM: CONTRI BUTIONS TO AMERI CAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 327-32 (R. 
Bruce Douglass & David Hollenbach eds., 1994). 
42. See, for example, Todd Whitmore‟s  critique of Michael Novak‟s failure 
to recognize that “the seemingly unending quest for more and more of ever 
more specialized and refined items and services in a consumer society is a 
spiritual and moral malady.” Todd David Whitmore, John Paul II, Michael 
Novak, and the Distance Between Them, 21 ANN. SOC‟Y CHRISTI AN ETHI CS 215, 
224 (2001). See also, for a perhaps trivial, but telling, example, Richard John 
Neuhaus, A Word for Commercializing Christmas, FIRS T THI NGS , Dec. 1993, at 
66, 76, warning his readers to be “braced for this year ‟s round of campaigning 
against the commercialization of Christmas,” Neuhaus goes on: “Last year the 
National Council of Churches (NCC) got a broad array of religious leadership 
types to sign on with a „Campaign to Take Commercialism Out of Christmas.‟” 
He quotes approvingly a description of the NCC‟s stance as “spiritual 
arrogance in a kind of snobbish hostility to the simple pleasures people get in 
buying, giving, and receiving.” Id. Neuhaus goes on, stating, “I see no 
sympathy toward the instinct of generosity nor any real appreciation of the 
genuine blessing of material prosperity. Advertisers and merchants are 
demonized, and their legitimate economic vocations are demeaned.” Id.  
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IV. RELATIVISM AND LIBERALISM 
What of the relation between relativism and liberalism? 
I have already commented (silently) on the claim that 
relativism flows from liberalism by proffering as a 
paradigmatic avowal of one core meaning of relativism, that 
of a paradigmatic conservative, Judge Richard Posner.43 
Recognizing, however, that the example may establish no 
more than the almost boundless variousness of meaning 
that the term, liberalism, has—Posner‟s support for “free 
market” allocations might even garner him that 
appellation—I will rely instead on another noted Chicago 
conservative, Cardinal Francis George. 
Cardinal George has supplied a penetrating and 
balanced account of the several arenas of thought in which 
the terms liberal and conservative each have varying but 
mutually reinforcing meanings. It is, in my judgment, fair-
minded, respectful and careful, and worth quoting 
extensively: 
[In] the political context, . . . [c]onservatives usually associate 
themselves with the constituted authorities, giving them the 
benefit of the doubt so that the order which saves us from anarchy 
and social violence can be maintained. Liberals contribute to the 
common good by beginning most often with a suspicion about 
abuse of authority and a critique of the exercise of power. They are 
a “loyal opposition,” loyal to the goals of good government but not 
to the established rulers when the rulers themselves impede the 
achievement of those goals. 
 
In the economic context, . . . liberals are more concerned with the 
distribution of wealth and look to government to see that the 
political equality of all citizens is mirrored, at least roughly, in 
their economic equality . . . . Conservatives . . . tend to be more 
concerned with the conditions of the creation of wealth and 
understand that the right to economic initiative cannot be 
separated from other individual rights and freedoms. In a business 
economy, they argue, all are enriched in time, even if there are 
serious inequalities for a time . . . . 
 
In the psychological context, “liberal” and “conservative” describe 
attitudes or mindsets toward societal change. Conservatives are 
closed to changes which threaten good order and liberals are more 
open to the risk of proposed change . . . . 
 
43. POS NE R, supra note 12, at 6. 
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In epistemological theory, . . . respective stances toward the 
foundations of knowledge differentiate liberals and  conservatives . 
. . . Conservative certitude and the legitimate quest for certitude 
about the foundations either of faith or of an intellectual discipline 
can be pushed into fundamentalism; liberal criticism of the same 
foundations can degenerate into skepticism or . . . relativism . . . .44 
These attributions rigorously avoid exaggeration or 
pejorative; I find in them nothing that a liberal or 
conservative need seriously disavow or object to. (Indeed, 
one would need to look elsewhere—although perhaps no 
further than the remainder of the essay—even to infer from 
them which stance the author favors). His only assertion of 
the connection between liberalism and relativism—“liberal 
criticism can degenerate into relativism”—obviously 
presumes the infirmity of relativism, but he is speaking 
about liberalism, not relativism. He resists any urge further 
to link the two, and in place of the bogey that anti-relativist 
rhetoric so often heatedly conjures up, we find in his words 
only a cautionary admonition, one that liberals would do 
well to take to heart.45 
Cardinal George‟s ability and willingness to speak 
empathically of views he does not himself hold aids me to 
 
44. Francis George, How Liberalism Fails the Church: The Cardinal 
Explains, COMMONWE AL, Nov. 19, 1999, at 24. Although of lesser relevance 
here, Cardinal George‟s explication of the meaning of these terms in one 
additional context , that of “American religion,” deserves not to be omitted. He 
asserts: 
[L]iberal religion treats God as an ideal, a goal expressing all that is 
best in human experience, while the real agents of change in the world 
are human persons. Religious language is important poetry, agnostic 
about who God is, but expressive of our experience of wholeness. . . . 
Worship may be structured but, at its heart, religion is ethical and the 
social agenda central. By contrast, conservative religion is keenly 
aware of God ‟s agency. God is real, independent, powerful, active. God ‟s 
presence is felt in prayer and in the reading of his holy word. Religious 
language is most often literal, and the Bible is often read much like a 
newspaper . . . . The social agenda tends to be peripheral, because God 
will change things at . . . some . . . moment we can only wait for.  
Id. at 25. 
45. An exchange with Ed Hartnett has led me to recognize—too late to 
correct the error—that my passing agreement with Cardinal George‟s 
admonition does not adequately attend to its importance and relevance. See 
infra , note 112 and accompanying text .  
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realize that much of the asserted linking of liberalism and 
relativism may proceed from an unacknowledged conflation 
of relativism and pluralism. The similarities are real, yet 
the differences are fundamental. Pluralism asserts that, 
although objective criteria support (at least some) of our 
ethical choices, a person‟s or group‟s beliefs (however 
strongly held) do not justify insisting that others, who 
believe the contrary, nonetheless live by them. Pluralism is 
an approach to the question of how a society should respond 
to the fact that there is a great (although not limitless) 
diversity of moral norms among people of good will. To the 
extent that pluralism speaks to us as individuals, it affects 
our opinions and beliefs, not by altering their content or 
even the assurance with which we hold them, but rather 
ameliorating the intensity and fervor with which we assert 
them and the stance that we take toward those whose 
moral sense differs from our own. 
There are some who regard the pluralism of civil society 
as, at best, a regrettable necessity, perhaps hopefully a 
temporary one, until enough of their fellow citizens come to 
see the rightness of their views that there is the political 
will needed to act on them. However, pluralism as a 
philosophical stance—and here it may well be intertwined 
with political liberalism—is rooted in a celebration, rather 
than a grudging and resigned acceptance, of the diversity of 
moral insight. Pluralism proceeds from the belief that as 
humans we are created (and this word can be understood in 
religious or secular terms) with the capacity and the desire 
to seek, to discern, and to follow the good, but that in all of 
those capacities and desires we are limited—in no way more 
than in our capacity to know that we have authoritatively 
found the Truth. 
In this way, it may supply what Lawrence Hinman 
terms a “middle ground” between relativism and realism 
(which he terms “absolutism”), one that “incorporates 
insights from both”: 
From relativism, it retains the sensitivity to the contextuality of 
our moral beliefs and the recognition that moral disagreement and 
conflict are permanent features of the moral landscape. From 
absolutism, it retains the commitment to the relevance of reasoned 
discourse in the moral life and the belief that some moral positions 
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are better than others.46 
It would be naïve to suggest that those who scornfully 
dismiss relativism, on pondering the ways in which 
pluralism differs from it, would find pluralism attractive. I 
do think that their continuing critique would necessarily 
focus more authentically on the matters genuinely at issue, 
which I will explore in the succeeding sections of this Essay. 
V. TRUTH AND CERTAINTY 
To return to what I believe is the fundamental failing of 
anti-relativism, the attempt to support a moral claim by 
attacking relativism, ignores—or, worse yet, diverts 
attention from—the fact that any assertion of a truth about 
morality raises, but does not answer, the question, how one 
knows it. Jeffrey Stout has made the point well, in my 
judgment: 
I claim that positing a transcendent Moral Law (or the like) does 
not help explain what it is for a moral proposition to be true. Nor, I 
claim, does such a posit help as a criterion for judging the truth of 
moral propositions. [However,] neither of these claims . . . implies 
that there are no moral truths.47 
To speak as Stout does is to insist that a claim of the 
truth of a moral matter engages the distinction between 
there being a “truth of a matter” (which exists independent 
of what anyone believes regarding it) and the justification 
for believing the truth of an assertion regarding its content. 
The existence of such a distinction is certainly open to 
challenge, but it should not be elided, whether by one who 
doubts the reality of a mind-independent truth or by one 
who is certain that he or she knows what the content of 
that truth is. 
 
46. LAWRENCE HI NMAN, ETHI CS: A PLURALISTI C APPROACH TO MORAL THEORY 
48 (1994). On the need for pluralism to “police its boundaries,” see JOAN F. 
GOODM AN & HOWARD LESNI CK, THE MORAL STAKE IN EDUCATION: CONTESTED 
PREMISES AND PRACTICES 100-03 (2000). 
47. JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL : THE LANGUAGES OF MORALS AND 
THEIR DISCONTENTS 35 (2001). Simon Blackburn notes that “you can admit the 
authority of truth without immediately supposing you possess it.” SIMON 
BLACKBURN, TRUTH: A GUI DE 29 (2005). Yes, and you can proclaim the authority 
of truth without establishing that you possess it. 
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The distinction is challenged frontally by many 
relativists. Denying the existence of “a transcendent Moral 
Law,”48 they draw their inspiration from John Dewey, to 
whom both belief and knowledge describe the same 
condition, which he termed “warranted assertibility” and 
which he described as “the institution of conditions which 
remove need for doubt”49: 
Belief may be so understood as to be a fitting designation for the 
outcome of inquiry. . . . The word knowledge is also a suitable term 
to designate the objective and close of inquiry . . . . That which 
satisfactorily terminates inquiry is, by definition, knowledge; it is 
knowledge because it is the appropriate close of inquiry . . . . [T]he 
term “warranted assertion” is preferred to the terms belief and 
knowledge. It is free from the ambiguity of these latter terms . . . .50 
What Dewey regarded as removing an ambiguity to me 
creates it. It is true that relativists would not define 
knowledge, as most philosophers ordinarily do, as belief 
that is true as well as justified51 because such usage 
suggests that “true” has a meaning that goes beyond 
“justification” or “warrant.” Since relativists deny that 
suggestion, they naturally will deem the standard 
definition question-begging. However, by giving “truth” a 
meaning that effectively conflates it with justification, they 
are also begging the question (although assuming a 
different answer). 
It seems clearer to retain the verbal distinction, while 
allowing relativists to preserve their objection to the 
metaphysical existence of truth so defined, rather than to 
define the issue away. Preserving the distinction between 
belief and knowledge permits us readily to understand one 
another across that critical boundary, without necessarily 
crossing it, in either direction. For a non-relativist to assert 
that a specific moral norm is “true” is most usefully 
understood as a claim about (an instance of) the content of 
 
48. Id. 
49. DEWEY, supra note 23, at 7. 
50. Id. at 7-9. 
51. Linda Zagzebski, for example, refers to “[t]he traditional proposal that 
knowledge is true belief based upon good reasons . . . .” Linda Zagzebski, What 
is Knowledge?, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO EPISTEMOLOGY 92, 95 (John Greco & 
Ernest Sosa eds., 1999). 
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reality, and is a coherent statement to one who believes 
that no such reality exists, as well as to one who believes to 
the contrary. 
If “knowledge” denotes truth, its existence cannot be 
verified.52 “I may know, but do I know (or only believe) that 
I know; if I do (know), do I know (or only believe) that I 
know that I know;” et seq.—but it can be believed with 
greater and greater justification. The assertion that one 
“knows” is a functional claim, asserting that the extent of 
persisting uncertainty is of no existential or decisional 
significance. Conceptually, it may be faulted as analogous 
to taking a last step to disregard or overpower (rather than 
respect or transcend) Zeno‟s Paradox: If, having begun in 
Philadelphia, I successively travel one-half of the distance 
to Ann Arbor 100 times, it is “true” that I am not yet there, 
but I may nonetheless have a compelling reason to act as if 
I am, and no reason to act as if I am not. Indeed, in most 
circumstances, to say that I am not yet there would simply 
be a bit of pedantry, even though neither inductively nor 
deductively can the gap remaining be bridged. 
The millions of people who would join Job in insisting, 
“I know that my Redeemer liveth,”53 have taken that “last 
step” as their first, by reason of religious faith. Faith may 
ground certainty, as may love (and perhaps even hope), but 
reason cannot.54 Martha Nussbaum, writing of “Love‟s 
Knowledge,” terms that condition “cataleptic”: “The 
cataleptic impression is said to have the power,” she writes, 
“just through its own felt quality, to drag us to assent, to 
 
52. What Jeremy Waldron writes about justice is more broadly apt: “No 
matter how often or emphatically we deploy words like „objective,‟ a claim about 
what justice objectively requires never appears except as someone‟s view . . . . 
Although there may be an objective truth about justice . . . it inevitably comes to 
us as one contestant view among others.” Jeremy Waldron, The Circumstances 
of Integrity, 3 LEGAL THEORY 1, 13 (1997). 
53. Job 19:25 (emphasis added). 
54. Arthur Leff again remains persuasive: 
One would think that a fully considered moral position, the product of 
deep and thorough intellectual activity, one that fits together into a 
fairly consistent whole, would deserve more respect than shallow, 
expletive, internally inconsistent ethical decisions. Alas, to think that 
would be to think wrong: labor and logic have no necessary connection 
to ethical truth. 
Leff, supra note 21, at 1238. 
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convince us that things could not be otherwise.”55 One may 
then be speaking loosely of “certainty,” yet have warrant for 
the avowal. 
But certainty is necessarily a condition that describes 
the stance toward reality of the person-believing (or 
knowing). It cannot be a statement about the world external 
to the speaker, for no one has unmediated access to reality 
or unmediated access to anyone else‟s assertion of such 
access.56 Even Euclid never “looked on Reality bare.”57 
To the “certain” believer—whether the source of 
certainty is faith, love, or reason—it will not appear so, and 
for him or her to speak as if nothing has been said about 
 
55. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, Love‟s Knowledge, in LOVE‟S KNOWLEDGE: ESS AYS 
ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITE RATURE 261, 265 (1990). 
56. Access to another‟s claim is necessarily mediated by belief in the truth of 
the other‟s access. Robert Bellah felicitously asserts, “[t]here is no truth that 
truths itself,” Robert N. Bellah, At Home and Not At Home: Religious Pluralism 
and Religious Truth, CHRISTI AN CENTURY, Apr. 19, 1995, at 425; and David 
Luban terms revelation “esoteric,” in the sense that “to rely on it is to have faith 
in the prophets who communicate the revelation.” David Luban, A Theological 
Argument Against Theopolitics, 16 INST . FOR PHIL. & PUB. POL‟Y REP. 10, 13 
(1996). Jeff Powell describes the opposition of seventeenth century British 
Protestants to any exposition of Scripture that “went beyond the text [as], of 
necessity, a „human invention,‟ „which a discreet Man may do well; but ‟tis his 
Scripture, not the Holy Ghost[‟s]‟.” H. Jefferson Powell, The Original 
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 889-90 (1985) (quoting 
JOHN SELDE N, TABLE-TALK: BEING THE DISCOURSE OF JOHN SELDEN ESQ. 45 
(1699)). One of the most famous teachings of George Fox, founder of the 
Religious Society of Friends, challenges those whose “knowledge” of God is not 
based on direct personal experience but on the witness of others (even those 
who, in his mind, were History‟s highest witnesses to Truth). Margaret Fell, an 
early supporter and later his wife, reports first hearing Fox preach in these 
words: 
[T]he scriptures were the prophets‟ words, and Christ‟s and the 
apostles‟ words, and what as they spoke they enjoyed and possessed, 
and had it from the Lord . . . [t]hen what had any to do with the 
scriptures, but as they came to the spirit that gave them forth. You will 
say, Christ saith this, and the apostles say this; but what canst thou 
say? . . . [W]hat thou speakest, is it inwardly from God? 
Margaret Fox, The Testimony of Margaret Fox , in 1 THE WORKS OF GEORGE FOX 
49, 50 (1975). On hearing this, Margaret Fox “cried bitterly. . .„[w]e are all 
thieves, we are all thieves, we have taken the scriptures in words, and know 
nothing of them in ourselves.‟” Id. 
57. Edna St. Vincent Millay may have led us to understate the matter, I am 
suggesting, when she began a sonnet, “Euclid alone has looked on Beauty bare.” 
EDNA ST. V INCENT MILLAY, Euclid Alone has Looked on Beauty Bare, in THE 
SELECTED POETRY OF EDNA ST. V INCENT MILLAY 155 (2001). 
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“reality bare” is to belie that certainty. It cannot be 
inherently improper to refuse to do so. Yet, there is a 
boundary, I suggest, the crossing of which is not justified by 
certainty of belief. I will use the term triumphalism to 
describe that which lies across that boundary, and turn now 
to its exploration. 
VI. TRIUMPHALISM 
To me, the essence of triumphalism—whether in 
religion, nationalism, or any other profound source of 
values58—is the movement beyond holding a set of beliefs as 
“known,” as to be true and certain, to maintaining that such 
certainty suffices to delegitimate any claim that the 
contrary belief of another may be justified. That is just the 
difference that Robert Bolt‟s Sir Thomas More (as quoted in 
the epigraph to this Essay) realized and, after a momentary 
spontaneous lapse, respected regarding his commitment to 
the truth of the Papal claim to the authority given by Jesus 
to St. Peter. More would not take an oath avowing that 
which contradicted his actual belief. It was the fact of his 
belief, and not the truth of its foundation (although he 
believed it to be true), that was dispositive. 
More was confronting a dissonance between his speech 
(the oath)59 and his beliefs. More typically, the conflict is 
between the sense of certainty about the truth of one‟s 
beliefs and the fact that others question their truth (and 
what may follow from them). Clifford Geertz has described 
felicitously the reason why conversation in that context is 
challenging. He writes of “the collection of notions a people 
has of how reality is at base put together” as its world view, 
and the “general style of . . . the way they do things and like 
to see things done” as its ethos.60 He describes “the office of 
religious symbols” as to “render the world view believable 
 
58. The primary example of the merging of nationalist and religious grounds 
is Israel, as its renewed existence (after 1900 years) and continued survival is 
understood by many Jews (and Christians). Certain varieties of “American 
exceptionalism” fit this model, usually (although perhaps not necessarily) 
through a religious foundation, which sees this country as in some unexplained 
way the special object of providential care. I will not address the phenomenon of 
nationalist triumphalism, whether religiously based or not. 
59. “What is an oath but words we say to God?” BOLT, supra note 1, at 140. 
60. GEERTZ, supra  note 34, at 97. 
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and the ethos justifiable . . . by invoking each in support of 
the other,”61 and observes: 
Seen from outside the religious perspective, this sort of hanging a 
picture from a nail driven into its frame appears as a kind of 
sleight of hand. Seen from inside, it appears as a simple fact. . . . 
[R]eligious beliefs . . . are regarded as being not conclusions from 
experience . . . but as being prior to it. For those who hold them, 
religious beliefs are not inductive, they are paradigmatic; the 
world . . . provides not evidences for their truth but illustrations of 
it. They are a light cast upon human life from somewhere outside 
it.62 
What to the believer is obvious, to the skeptic is simple 
question-begging. What the one sees in the other as 
obduracy (or worse), the other sees in the one as 
triumphalism (or worse). The willingness to entertain the 
possibility that one‟s fundamental avowals are in error is to 
one a fateful step on a dark and slippery road to apostasy; 
the unwillingness to take that step is to the other a mark of 
subjection (nascent or full-blown) to “tyranny over the 
mind.”63 
Alvin Plantinga, defending the ethical permissibility of 
believing that his religion is true and that other beliefs, 
when contrary to it, are false, observes: 
I must concede that there are a variety of ways in which I can be 
and have been intellectually arrogant and egotistic; I have 
certainly fallen into this vice in the past and no doubt am not free 
of it now. But am I really arrogant and egotistic just by virtue of 
believing what I know others don‟t believe, where I can‟t show 
 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 97-98. Note that what Geertz denies regarding religious beliefs is 
not their foundation in experience, but that they embody “conclusions from 
experience.” Id. at 98. The grounding “paradigm” may be an “experience,” but it 
is not itself the product of reflection. Quakers claim that faith can be grounded 
on each person‟s direct unmediated experience of the Divine Presence. See Fox, 
supra note 56. 
63. On the wall of the Jefferson Memorial in Washington, D.C., is the 
inscription: “I have sworn upon the alter of God eternal hostility against every 
form of tyranny over the mind of man.” Thomas Jefferson Memorial: Statue 
Chamber Inscriptions, http://www.nps.gov/archive/thje/memorial/inscript.htm 
(last visited Oct . 8, 2007). 
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them that I am right?64 
The problem, however, is deeper than the presence or 
absence of such ethically dubious personality traits as 
arrogance or egotism. Some—not all, but some—religious 
people regard their faith as primarily concerning the truth 
of certain propositions about the nature of reality, including 
the authority of religious texts or institutions to express or 
propound such truths and their moral implications.65 Part 
of that set of beliefs is often a felt obligation to be 
exceedingly wary of attempts to be persuaded to violate one 
or more of the norms of their faith.66 It is also true that, for 
many believers, the matter is not one of conscious will, for 
they do not regard their assent as a voluntary decision. 
Paul Griffiths has described the experience of such people 
this way: 
[T]here is a long (and usually complicated) story to be told about 
why I find myself involuntarily moved to assent to these claims at 
a particular time.  Usually, that story will involve reference to 
habits, skills, and knowledge I‟ve gained in the past,  but in all 
cases the upshot is the same: I find myself irresistibly moved to 
assent . . . . I cannot deliberate and then decide whether to believe 
it or not. When I find myself assenting to some claim (believing it, 
taking it as true), then, my assent typically does not involve choice 
or deliberation. It is simply given to me.67 
 
64. Alvin Plantinga, Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism, in THE 
RATIONALITY OF BELIEF AND THE PLURALITY OF FAITH: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
WILLIAM P. ALSTON 191, 200 (Thomas D. Senor ed., 1995) (emphasis added). 
65. See, e.g., PAUL J. GRIFFITHS, AN APOLOGY FOR APOLOGETICS : A STUDY IN 
THE LOGIC OF INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 9-12 (1991). For a capsule description of 
contending approaches, see supra note 20. 
66. For some (not all) such people, more is at stake than the outcome of a 
disagreement, more or less friendly, about a matter of metaphysics, ethics or 
public policy. In the friendly disputant‟s expressions may be heard the voice of 
Satan. Of course, holding the belief that the beliefs of another person (or worse, 
a person who holds to such beliefs) are the work of the Devil is a moral hazard, 
and might lead the believer into seriously wrongful speech or conduct. Wariness 
is therefore an appropriate response; a preemptive dismissal is not. The one so 
believing will assert the defense of truth as justification, which the other will 
regard as compounding the felony. That this leads to an infinite regress is a 
problem, but that observation is not a solution to the problem. 
67. PAUL J. GRIFFITHS, PROBLEMS OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY 26 (2001). An 
elaboration of this phenomenon, more textured than Griffiths‟s but with a very 
similar final lesson for non-believers, has been articulated by Jewish theologian 
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Non-religious people should therefore be cautious 
about dismissing as triumphalist or impositional the 
reluctance or unwillingness of some (again, not all, but 
some) religious believers to find legitimacy or (in some 
sense) validity of other religions, to acknowledge that 
others may have justification for holding their 
understanding of the truth, or to engage in “dialogue” 
about matters of belief (or morality grounded in belief) 
with those who disagree.68 All other things being equal, 
openness to dialogue across difference is, in my judgment, a 
good, but it is not inherently a universal moral imperative, 
and all else is not always equal.69 The matter turns on the 
specifics of the individual actor‟s motivation, intention , 
and—especially—actions. Imposition is a serious wrong; a 
triumphalist attitude alone may best be thought of as 
simply a source of interpersonal incompatibility. 
However, triumphalist attitudes tend to leach into 
 
Neil Gillman: 
What distinguishes the “insider” from the “outsider” is that for the 
former, the whole coheres in an ultimately satisfying way. . . . [M]ost of 
the major religions are rich and variegated enough . . . that as a whole, 
the tradition still works for many . . . . How all of this works itself out 
in the life experience of any one individual is subtle and complex.  
But . . . [t]he decision can not be made from the outside. Religious 
commitments are probably the most existential issues we face. We 
have to be prepared to jump in and live within a tradition before we 
can appreciate its strengths and weaknesses. 
NEIL GILLMAN, SACRED FRAGMENTS: RECOVE RING THEOLOGY FOR THE MODERN 
JEW 33-34 (1990). For a discussion of the way in which the process “works” in 
primarily an experiential rather than a cognitive way, see MARK S. MASSA, 
CATHOLICS AND AMERI CAN CULTURE 156-58 (1999) (discussing the work of Emile 
Durkheim as a “social scientific version of one of the most ancient and revered 
Christian dictums . . . lex orandi lex credendi . . . „the law of praying founds the 
law of believing‟”). 
68. For a clear and (in my judgment) fair-minded introduction to the variety 
of views about the stance that Christian traditions and individuals should take 
toward other religions—a subject that has produced a voluminous literature—
see generally PAUL F. KNITTER, NO OTHE R NAME?: A CRITICAL SURVEY OF 
CHRISTI AN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WORLD RELIGIONS (1985). 
69. For the classic statement of the traditional Jewish wariness about 
“dialogue” with Christians, see Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Confrontation, 6 
TRADITION 5 (1964). Rabbi Soloveitchik wrote just as significant change was 
about to appear. See Eugene B. Borowitz, A Nearness in Difference: Jewish-
Christian Dialogue Since Vatican II, COMMONWEAL , Jan. 13, 2006, at 17, 19-20 
(describing the author‟s experience of the radical change over the past four 
decades in the setting in which Jewish-Christian dialogue takes place). 
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actions. Indeed, the expression of an attitude is itself an 
action, in the practical sense that it can “pinch” those who 
do not share its wellsprings. This, I believe, is the core of 
the problem of the appropriateness of certain forms of 
public prayer: What to the devout may be simply a 
legitimate desire to express deep-seated feelings of 
gratitude or dependency on “He from whom all blessings 
flow,” when joined by a large percentage of the like-minded 
cannot help but constrain the freedom of those who differ.70 
More broadly, “certain” believers need to realize that 
their certainty, like the belief to which it relates, is “theirs,” 
not only in the sense that it is an aspect of their identity, 
but that it cannot escape its boundary in the self. As a 
statement about the world, it may well be true but its truth 
(like all such truths) is not verifiable.71 Donald Davidson‟s 
dictum (a portion of which is quoted in the epigraph to this 
Essay) seems on point to me: “What distinguishes a 
coherence theory [which Davidson espouses] is simply the 
claim that nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief 
except another belief.”72 At the same time—and for the 
 
70. Cf. Marvin E. Frankel, Religion in Public Life—Reasons for Minimal 
Access, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633, 633-43 (1992). Judge Frankel asks, “Why . . . 
the proliferation of committees and public officials insisting that crèches be  
placed . . . on the public squares?” He answers, “[t]he reason . . . is exactly to 
show those others who‟s boss. This is Christian country. If you don‟t like it, as 
you presumably don‟t, you know what you can do.” Id. at 639. The issue is not 
resolvable, in my view, by a judicial judgment about the presence or absence of 
“coercion.” The concept is hostage to the Supreme Court ‟s deep divisions about 
its meaning. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), for the conflicting 
approaches espoused by Justice Kennedy for the Court, id. at 580, and Justice 
Scalia for four dissenters, id. at 631 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, the 
problem is deeper than that. As Stephen Gey wisely comments: “The choice 
seems to be between a narrow version of coercion theory, which produces 
coherent but unacceptable results, or a broad version . . . which is incoherent 
and unpredictable but [potentially] compatible with . . . religious liberty.” 
STEPHEN GEY, RELIGION AND THE STATE 247 (2d ed. 2006). More fundamentally, 
an occasional retrospective adversarial adjudication, whether focused on motive 
or effect, is inherently incapable of resolving the dispute satisfactorily. 
71. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
72. DAVIDSON, supra note 2, at 141. To a similar effect is Sanford Levinson: 
If someone argues to me that God requires X, whether X be social 
justice for the poor or the prohibition of eating pork, it simply cannot 
count as a reason for my doing X unless I share a view of the world that 
includes both the ontological reality of God‟s existence and the 
epistemological possibility of ascertaining divine desire. 
Sanford Levinson, The Multicultures of Belief and Disbelief, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
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same reason—the “justification” that others may have for 
their conflicting beliefs does not contradict the believers‟ 
own certainty, since justification makes no truth claim. The 
two incompatible beliefs may therefore reside, compatibly, 
though uncomfortably, alongside one another. 
A special complexity arises because of the need to 
consider the proper reach of the principle that members of a 
religious community may claim the right, free of adverse 
judgment from those who are not members, to attempt to 
keep “the faithful” faithful. I grew up feeling quite 
aggrieved by what I regarded as the efforts of the Roman 
Catholic Church to induce the polity to adopt its views 
regarding such matters as the censorship of movies, 
restrictions on the sale of contraceptives, and the 
availability of several varieties of medical intervention in 
life-threatening emergencies. I now see those past efforts as 
not so much aimed at me and other non-Catholics than as 
primarily reflecting the Church‟s concern for the moral 
environment of its communicants, increasingly attracted by 
the blandishments of a society responsive to other voices on 
moral issues.73 Whether and how a religious leader is 
obliged to keep in mind and make clear what his intended 
audience is, and to take responsibility for the wider scope of 
his predictable audience,74 is a singularly elusive question. 
To articulate the problem in the terms I have does not 
imply that a religious community may not police its 
boundaries by setting conditions on the permissibility of 
actions (or even speech) of its communicants as a condition 
 
1872, 1879 (1994). 
73. Steven Smith ably describes “The Spiritual Hazards of Religious 
Pluralism” from the perspective of the “devout believer,” in a chapter titled, 
The (Compelling?) Case for Religious Intolerance, in STEVEN D. SMITH, 
GETTI NG OVER EQUALITY: A CRITI CAL DI AGNOSIS  OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM I N 
AMERICA 144, 152-58 (2001). 
74. Pope Benedict XVI, on the eve of his election to that office, made the 
statement I quoted earlier (and have quarreled with) in a Homily during a 
Mass, a central moment in what is ordinarily a deeply private religious service. 
Supra note 9; supra text accompanying note 17. Yet his words were, 
predictably, almost instantly transmitted throughout the world—to millions of 
Catholics, to be sure, but to millions of non-Catholics as well. Similarly, an 
essay of his titled, Relativism: The Central Problem for Faith Today, was first 
delivered to a gathering of Roman Catholic Bishops, but has been (foreseeably) 
widely read. Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Relativism: The Central Problem for 
Faith Today , 26 ORIGINS 309 (1996). 
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of membership.75 Nor does it presume that such a 
community (or an individual member) should not seek to 
influence the polity at large, in an effort to bring the civil 
law, binding on all, into correspondence with its moral 
beliefs on a matter. In my judgment, it is as appropriate for 
such a community to do that as for any participant in the 
polity.76 Individuals and institutions, religious and secular 
alike, are entitled to contend for a voice in setting public 
norms, whether cultural or legal. 
However, questions of the appropriateness and 
justification of such efforts, and the actors‟ responsibilities 
for adverse consequences on the quality of public life, are 
not exhausted by the issue of entitlement. Today, when 
examples such as censorship of movies and access to birth 
control are no longer at center stage, the issue remains. The 
adversarial manner in which Pope John Paul II engaged 
what he called “the culture of death”77 perhaps reflected a 
concern (shared by many Protestants, Jews, and Muslims, 
as well as not a few non-believers) with the moral climate of 
contemporary society, especially its effect on the practices of 
Roman Catholics. However, he described his teachings as 
embodying moral norms accessible through reason and 
therefore binding on all persons.78 Although, to that extent, 
 
75. Whether and when some forms of inducements (such as shunning, in 
insular communities), even if addressed only to co-religionists, press too hard 
upon the limits of that interest, is a separate question. 
76. Happily, I do not regard the validity of that judgment as within the 
scope of this Essay. See, from among a torrent of writing on the subject, KENT 
GREENAWALT , PRIVATE CONS CIENCES AND PUBLI C REASON (1995); KENT 
GREENAWALT , RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITI CAL CHOICE (1988). 
77. See, e.g., POPE JOHN PAUL II, THE GOSPEL OF LIFE [EVANGELI UM VITAE]   § 
28, at 50 (1995), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii / 
encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae_en.html (“[W]e are 
facing an enormous and dramatic clash between good and evil, death and life, 
the „culture of death‟ and the „culture of life.‟”).  
78. See, e.g., id. § 2, at 4-5: 
The Church knows that this Gospel of life, which she has received from 
her Lord, has a profound and persuasive echo in the heart of every 
person—believer and non-believer alike . . . . [E]very person sincerely 
open to truth and goodness can, by the light of reason and the hidden 
action of grace, come to recognize in the natural law written in the 
heart . . . the sacred value of human life . . . and can affirm the right of 
every human being to have this primary good respected to the highest 
degree. Upon the recognition of this right, every human community 
and the political community itself are founded. 
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he spoke outside of the “certainty” of revelation, all who 
differed were denounced as “relativists,” whatever their 
objections to the morality of his “culture of life,” and 
regardless of the secular or religious grounding of those 
objections. 
The reflexive move from a judgment of immorality to 
the espousal of regulation or prohibition by the secular law 
is an especially problematic move. Being certain of the 
truth of one‟s beliefs, rejecting the thought of dialogue 
with those who differ, refusal to entertain the possibility 
that they might be justified in their beliefs—all these 
might be justified as authentic, conscientiously held points 
of view. Invoking the power of the State to constrain, or 
even place at risk, the lives of others for their failure to see 
the world that way is quite another step. This is a large 
and complex area, and there would be no utility in my 
cataloguing my own evaluation of specific morally 
grounded public policy overtures. I mean only to claim 
validity for a genuine caution, and respect for difference, 
by those seeking to see public law adopt their 
understanding of moral truth. It is one thing to oppose the 
decriminalization of post-viability abortion; it is quite 
another to encourage pharmacists (especially on a broad 
scale or in areas lacking a plenitude of consumer choices) 
to refuse to fill prescriptions for “morning after” or birth 
control pills, on the ground that they are illicit methods of 
contraception or “abortifacients.”79 
 
For a measured description and appraisal, see James F. Childress, Moral 
Rhetoric and Moral Reasoning: Some Reflections on Evangelium Vitae, in 
CHOOSING LIFE: A DIALOGUE ON EVANGELI UM VITAE 21, 28-32 (Kevin Wm. Wildes 
& Alan C. Mitchell eds., 1997) (analyzing the Pope‟s “metaphor of war, enemy, 
conspiracy, and so forth”). 
79. A number of scholars writing out of the Roman Catholic tradition have 
expressed measured reflections on the emergent approach of the Vatican. 
Herminio Rico‟s study, John Paul II and the Legacy of Dignitatis Humanae is a 
carefully nuanced, sympathetic-yet-critical, account of Pope John Paul‟s 
preference for “the seeking of direct political influence” over “the patient 
formation of consciences and, though that change, achieving the transformation 
of the social consensus.” RICO, supra note 4, at 169-76. David Hollenbach 
grounds in the work of John Courtney Murray an eloquent case for “intellectual 
humility” in engaging with the “full array of intellectual currents present in 
culture” today. DAVID HOLLE NBACH, THE GLOBAL FACE OF PUBLIC FAITH: 
POLITICS, HUM AN RIGHTS, AND CHRISTI AN ETHI CS 142 (2003). “The virtue of 
society,” he maintains, 
is built from the bottom up, not mandated from the top down, and it is 
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Moreover, it is far from clear whether, and how far, the 
institutional interest in keeping the “flock” from straying 
justifiably applies to a communicant‟s participation in 
public life. Examples are strongly worded pastoral 
admonitions, whether coming from a Catholic prelate or an 
Orthodox Rabbi, to vote in public elections a certain way, 
and selective applications of internal sanctions to highly 
visible members of its faith community who hold, or are 
seeking, public office.80 
The rapidity and scope of the changes in prevailing 
norms of morality in many aspects of public and private 
life—too rapid and broad-ranging for some, too slow and 
limited for others—have produced vast areas of resentment 
and anger, further poisoning the atmosphere and making 
nearly everyone feel unheard and disentitled. In the context 
of that maelstrom, an attempt to unravel the multiple 
threads that should properly be brought to bear on more-or-
less public discourse may seem simply naïve. The narrow 
question I am considering here is whether one may justly 
complain of any input into public policy, not that it is 
religiously motivated, but that the attempt to gain support 
for a contested moral position by attacking relativism may 
be a demagogic diversion of attention from the merits of the 
question or a triumphalist constriction of the possibility of 
conscientious disagreement regarding them. 
 
built by citizens who take responsibility for their lives and for the well-
being of society through active participation in public life. A 
fundamental element of this social well-being is a robust commitment 
to the freedom of one‟s fellow-citizens. 
Id. at 139. For additional thoughtful analyses from within the Catholic 
tradition, see M. Cathleen Kaveny, The Limits of Ordinary Virtue: The Limits of 
the Criminal Law in Implementing Evangelium Vitae, in CHOOSING LIFE: A 
DIALOGUE ON EVANGELI UM VI TAE, supra note 77, at 132; Todd David Whitmore, 
What Would John Courtney Murray Say?: On Abortion and Euthanasia , 
COMMONWEAL , Oct. 7, 1994, at 16. Writing from an Evangelical Protestant 
perspective, David Skeel and William Stuntz have developed a sophisticated 
case for great restraint in moving from moral to legal prohibitions. David A. 
Skeel, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Christianity and the (Modest) Rule of Law, 8 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 809 (2006). 
80. For a sensitive and careful approach to this question from a Roman 
Catholic perspective, see Amelia J. Uelmen, The Spirituality of Communion: A 
Resource for Dialogue with Catholics in Public Life, 43 CATH. LAW. 289, 305-08 
(2004). The difficulty is compounded as to members of religious traditions 
whose leaders do not simply counsel their communicants on public issues, but 
whose theology makes the counsel binding on their actions. 
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The contours of the frontier that I have sought to 
describe are less substantive than attitudinal. They reflect 
the concerns I have expressed: the use of “anti-relativism” 
as a rhetorical diversion of the discourse, and the practice 
(which I have termed triumphalism) of going beyond the 
assertion of a certain commitment to the truth of a moral 
belief, to scornful dismissal of the possibility that others 
may be justified in believing otherwise. Whether such 
cautions have a greater capacity than substantive ones to 
penetrate the maelstrom is not altogether clear. 
VII. MORAL REALISM 
I want now to turn from claims to “know” the truth of a 
moral matter to issues raised by one making no such highly 
confident claim, but still asserting a justified belief about a 
disputed moral claim. To believe something, in the sense I 
am using the term here, is to think that it is probably 
true.81 The belief in question may be based on a hunch, an 
isolated intuition, or simply a habit of some kind. On 
examination, one may find no special reason to prefer it 
over its denial, but in the absence of a felt need for inquiry 
or an encounter with an occasion for skepticism, it simply 
resides in the mind undisturbed, if only for the time being. 
Justification for belief requires something more. I 
cannot attempt here—or, truth be told, anywhere—a 
developed expression of the conditions that constitute 
justification for belief. Suffice it to say that I find 
persuasive the approach suggested by John Rawls‟s notion 
of “considered judgment in reflective equilibrium.”82 What I 
understand by that state is that the belief in question has a 
stabilizing and resonating coherence with my overall 
understanding of the world and my place in it, and 
specifically with my overall moral judgments. As I 
suggested earlier,83 justified belief differs from knowledge 
 
81. I am speaking of “belief” in the sense of what has been termed “belief 
that,” as distinguished from “belief in,” which connotes trust or commitment. 
Many assert that religious belief is more properly seen as of that latter kind. 
See, e.g., MARCUS BORG, THE HEART OF CHRISTIANITY: REDISCOVERI NG A LIFE OF 
FAITH 25-42 (2004). Compare the differing views described supra  note 20. 
82. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 46 (1971); see also id. at 46-53 
(presenting a fuller discussion of Rawls‟s approach). 
83. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
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because knowledge (in the sense that seems most useful to 
me) denotes truth, which is a metaphysical and not merely 
an epistemological concept, and cannot be verified. While 
both a relativist and a realist may speak in a similar way of 
justified belief, they differ in that the former can assert that 
two inconsistent beliefs may each be “true” for one of two 
belief-holders, while the realist‟s assertion would be that 
both beliefs may be justified, but no more than one can be 
true. 
This is not the place, and I am not the person, for a full 
presentation of the case for believing (and believing oneself 
justified in believing) that moral realism is true. 
Nonetheless, since I have made extensive use of the notion, 
and have made it somewhat relevant to the burden of this 
Essay to assert that I am not a relativist, I think it 
warranted, perhaps required, that I offer a summary of the 
considerations that ground my beliefs. All of them are 
relevant, some more weighty than others; together I find 
them a persuasive set. 
It bears noting, first, that my moral claims appear to be 
statements about a state of affairs that exists outside of my 
perceptions of it (although that statement is, of course, a 
perception of mine). More importantly (since a relativist 
might understand his or her moral claims in that general 
way), it seems to be the case that my own (like others‟) 
beliefs as to the right and wrong of a matter tend to be 
bound up in an underlying conviction that those beliefs are 
actually true. A person asserting that a certain act is right 
(or wrong) does not ordinarily appear simply to be telling us 
something about himself or herself, or his or her affinity 
group.84 
It is also the case that awareness of the variousness of 
moral norms and their evolution across time and cultures 
may (as an empirical matter) be the cause of relativist 
beliefs, but it does not logically imply it. Indeed, despite the 
 
84. As Sidney Morgenbesser notes, “the person is attempting 
simultaneously to affirm something about his own approvals, and also to claim 
that if the person addressed knew of certain factors or if he underwent certain 
experiences, he would agree with him in attitude.” Sidney Morgenbesser, 
Approaches to Ethical Objectivity, in MORAL EDUCATION 72, 77 (Barry I. 
Chazan & Jonas J. Soltis eds., 1973). The word “certain” is so open-textured 
that I can agree with Morgenbesser, although I suspect that my list of 
necessary “factors” and “experiences” would be longer than his.  
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salience of that awareness, I think it less significant than 
the existence of a startling amount of moral agreement.85 
Beyond that, exploration of the bases of change and 
divergence themselves actually supports realist premises. It 
places the question in context to think about the issue as it 
comes up in the scientific realm. John Searle notes86 that 
the fact that “scientific revolutions” take place supports, 
rather than undermines, belief in mind-independent truth: 
“[W]e would not bother to change our account from classical 
physics to relativity physics except on the presupposition 
that there is a way the universe really is, and we are trying 
to get as close as we can to stating how it is.”87 In the moral 
arena, Richard Shweder and Jeffrey Stout have 
persuasively undermined reliance on two classic situations 
proffered as counter-examples of the reality of moral truth. 
Their analyses are powerful and the lessons they draw are 
of general import. 
Shweder considers Richard Posner‟s claim that the 
context in which infanticide and slavery were practiced in 
the ancient world made them morally appropriate, and that 
such a realization implies the truth of relativism. Posner 
reasoned: 
Infanticide is abhorred in our culture, but routine in societies that 
lack the resources to feed all the children that are born. Slavery is 
routine when the victors in war cannot afford to feed or free their 
captives, so that the alternative to slavery is death . . . . It is 
provincial to say that “we are right about slavery . . . and the 
Greeks wrong,” so different was slavery in the ancient world from 
racial enslavement, as practiced, for example, in the United States 
until the end of the Civil War, and so different were the material 
conditions that nurtured these different forms of slavery . .  . . The 
inhabitants of an infanticidal or slave society would say with equal 
 
85. For excellent  examples of articulation of the presence of an important 
core of intercultural agreement on the fundamental norms of morality, see 
SISSELA BOK, COMMON VALUES 13-19 (1995); Richard Shweder, Moral Realism 
Without the Ethnocentrism: Is it Just a List of Empty Truisms?, in HUM AN 
RIGHTS WI TH MODESTY: THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERS ALISM  65 (Andras Sajo ed., 
2004). 
86. The term Searle uses is  “external realism,” by which he means that 
“there exists a way that things are that is independent of our representations 
of how things are.” John Searle, Reality and Relativism: Shweder on a Which? 
Hunt, 6  ANTHROPOLOGICAL THE ORY 112 (2006). 
87. Id. at 113. 
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plausibility that infanticide or slavery is presumptively good, 
though they might allow that the presumption could be rebutted in 
peaceable, wealthy, technologically complex societies. 88 
Far from seeing these culture-specific differences as 
probative of the truth of relativism, Shweder draws from 
Posner‟s explanations just the opposite lesson: 
Judge Posner constructs and interprets both infanticide and 
slavery . . . as cases that are intelligible as morally valid practices . 
. . by representing each practice as a means to a universally 
recognized moral good—namely the reduction of physical harm (to 
already born children and to the slaves themselves, respectively). . 
. . 
Posner‟s argument is potentially persuasive because he is able to 
direct our attention to the moral integrity of local contexts; and 
those local contexts become morally intelligible precisely because 
he can presuppose and thus trade on our common sense revelation 
of a base set of moral truths. . . . 
The correctness of a moral judgment may well be relative to 
circumstances. Nevertheless, implicit in Posner‟s argument is the 
idea that . . . with an informed understanding of the local scene 
any rational person should be able to recognize those practices, in 
those instances and under those circumstances, as local 
instantiations of some universal moral ideal . . . .89 
Stout considers Sartre‟s famous account of the young 
man who had to choose between supporting his aged 
mother and joining the French Resistance, which Sartre 
characterizes as “supporting the conclusion that moral 
judgments express unreasoned choices.”90 “Yet,” Stout goes 
on: 
Sartre is able to paint the dilemma in considerable detail, and 
each detail is itself a sample of the moral knowledge that Sartre is 
trying to deny us. In showing or saying that one consideration 
balances another he reveals his own recognition of the nature and 
force of the various considerations, and appeals to our own 
recognition of their nature and force. Dilemmas of this kind show 
 
88. Richard Posner, The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Problematics 
of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV . L. REV. 1637, 1650-51 (1998). 
89. Shweder, supra note 85, at 88-89. 
90. STOUT , supra note 47, at 46. Such a view is not relativism, for it suggests 
the absence of even a relative-to-circumstances basis for rational preference, 
but has in common with it a denial of the realist claim—a susceptibility to the 
response that Stout makes in the passage in the text. Id. 
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us, sometimes quite vividly and poignantly, where our moral 
uncertainties, and thus our probable areas of moral disagreement, 
are. But they don‟t show that there‟s no such thing as moral truth 
or justified moral belief. In fact . . . they trade on the assumption 
that certain moral beliefs are justified and true in making their 
point.91 
How far Stout‟s argument carries one implicates the 
question whether moral discernment “runs out,” as it were, 
so that as to some highly specific questions there is no 
“right answer.” I consider that question briefly below.92 
In considering the weight of these factors, it is 
important to realize that much of the resistance to the 
acceptance of moral realism is supported by the attachment 
to it of the baggage of several thoughts or qualities that 
(rightly) seem dubious, but which are plainly separable. I 
here address five: 
(i) To speak of the “existence” of moral truth is not to 
assert that, in Thomas Nagel‟s words, “they must be real 
objects of some other kind.”93 Interestingly enough, the 
same mistaken assumption is made, by believers and 
skeptics alike, about the necessary meaning of an avowal of 
the existence of God. Gordon Kaufman writes of the need to 
“de-reify” God-language: 
[D]evotion to the “creator/lord” today should be understood as 
consisting in the attempt to live in rapport with the movements of 
life and history that provide the actual context of our human 
existence; it is to attempt to be in tune with what we discern as 
the nature of things . . . .94 
Writing out of the tradition of Reconstructionist 
Judaism, Rabbi Harold Kushner observes: “God is not an 
entity out in space somewhere[;]”95 the question of God‟s 
 
91. Id. at 46-47. 
92. See infra text accompanying notes 101-08. 
93. THOM AS NAGEL, THE V IEW FROM NOWHE RE 144 (1986). I find Nagel‟s 
succinct discussion of realism and anti-realism cogent and persuasive. Id. at 
138-52. 
94. Gordon D. Kaufman, Reconstructing the Concept of God: De-reifying the 
Anthropomorphisms, in THE MAKING AND REMAKING OF CHRISTI AN DOCTRINE 96, 
102 (Sarah Coakley & David A. Pailin eds., 1993). 
95. HAROLD KUS HNE R, WHE N CHILDREN ASK ABOUT GOD 98 (1976). 
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existence need not be thought of as one “about the 
population of Heaven.”96 
One may reject these theological views and yet 
recognize that the traditional assumption confuses the 
familiar and the essential, whether the question arises with 
respect to religious or philosophical language. 
(ii) John Finnis is perhaps the best-known contemporary 
philosopher who espouses a morality of “exceptionless 
norms.”97 The classic expression of such an approach is Kant‟s 
assertion of an obligation to tell the truth to a would-be 
murderer who has asked one for the whereabouts of his or 
her intended victim.98 While one holding such a view of 
morality would probably be a realist, it is neither logically 
nor empirically true that moral realism entails, or even 
inherently tends toward, such an avowal. The existence of 
mind-independent truth is a different matter from the 
question of its content, and recognition that a moral 
judgment should be nuanced, qualified, or context-specific 
makes its truth more difficult to discern and articulate, and 
multiplies points of potential disagreement, but it doesn‟t 
introduce a subjectivity that was not otherwise warranted. 
One may say that Kant is right in asserting a broad 
deontological justification for the immorality of lying, and 
nonetheless dispute his application of it to the instance 
stated.99 Insisting on drawing the line at telling the truth to 
would-be murderers applies, rather than eliminates, an 
asserted distinction between right and wrong. 
(iii) Realist metaphysics is not at all inconsistent with 
uncertainty about the correctness of particularized moral 
judgments. Indeed, a coherentist conception of justification 
for belief100 implies the possible existence of circumstances 
 
96. Id. at 56. 
97. JOHN FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES: TRADITION, REVISION, AND TRUTH 1-6 
(1991). 
98. See Immanuel Kant, On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of 
Philanthropic Concerns, in GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS  OF MORALS 63, 63 
(James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ‟g Co. 1993) (1785). 
99. See Michael S. Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 IS R. L. REV. 
280, 315-16 (1989); see also Dietrich Bonhoeffer, What is Meant By „Telling the 
Truth‟?, in LYI NG: MORAL CHOI CE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 262, 264 (Sissela 
Bok ed., 1989). 
100. See supra  notes 82-84 and accompanying text. 
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in which the complexity or subtlety of the factors that bear 
on a moral question, and the limits of the evaluator‟s access 
to knowledge of some of those factors, make uncertainty in 
application wholly predictable and wholly appropriate. If I 
may be forgiven for an egregious mix of metaphors, that we 
“see through a glass, darkly” does not imply that “there is 
no there there.” Jeffrey Stout puts the matter more 
elegantly: “We should not confuse doubting that there is a 
single best thing to do in a given case with doubting that 
there is a moral truth with respect to that case.”101 
This question is presented, although not resolved, if one 
rejects (in the case at hand, or in general) blanket 
condemnation (a la Finnis) of a given act regardless of 
considerations of justification. Abortion is, of course, the 
premier case in point. To one who finds the act of 
intentionally inducing an abortion to be illicit without 
regard to any further considerations—whether from the 
moment of conception, the end of the possibility of 
“twinning,” the fortieth day of pregnancy, the onset of 
viability, or any other assertedly critical moment in fetal 
development—the issue of uncertainty does not arise 
(except, at times, with respect to those facts). That one such 
as myself deems such views morally infirm, does not imply 
that every instance of “abortion on demand” is a morally 
acceptable “choice.”102 I believe that the factors bearing on a 
proper moral judgment are not only various and subtle, but 
are often not fully accessible to anyone but the mother, 
especially so to outsiders to her family. I am certain that 
many abortions lack, and that many have, moral 
acceptability, but I also believe, no less strongly, that even a 
careful appraisal of the relevant factors will often not 
enable an outsider to judge the matter very confidently.103 
 
101. STOUT, supra  note 47, at  47. 
102. I hope it is obvious that the truth of the sentence in the text would not 
be vitiated by disagreement with my view as to the morality of abortion. For 
moral assertions grounded in their faith traditions but roughly congruent with 
my views, see EV ANGELI CAL LUTHE RAN CHURCH IN AMERICA, A SOCIAL STATEMENT 
ON ABORTION (1991), available at http://www.elca.org/SocialStatements/abortion/; 
and Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), http://www.pcusa.org/101/101-abortion.htm (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2007). 
103. For a rigorous, sensitive, and probing illustration of the variousness 
and complexity of the question, see James A. Gustafson, A Protestant Ethical 
Perspective, in THE MORALITY OF ABORTION: LEGAL AND HISTORI CAL 
PERSPECTIVES 101 (John T. Noonan ed., 1970). For a more general discussion, 
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The barriers to epistemic confidence are formidable, and for 
that reason alone legal barriers or other coercive responses 
are, in my judgment, morally unjustified. 
Abortion to one side, I believe that epistemic modesty in 
judging the moral universe of others is often morally 
appropriate, and that its absence is a morally hazardous 
trait, but whether that judgment is right or wrong, 
epistemic modesty is not inconsistent with a realist view of 
morality. 
(iv) The polar concern is equally misplaced. Moral 
realism does not warrant, or justifiably lead to, excessive 
certainty about moral judgments. Realists about moral 
questions—I defer to the next paragraph reference to 
judgments based on revelation—have in principle no lesser 
capacity than relativists to recognize the tentativeness of 
their moral beliefs. Katharine Bartlett has wisely described 
an outlook that a sensible moral realist would find wholly 
apt, one of “an ideal of self-critical commitment whereby I 
act, but consider the truths upon which I act subject to 
further refinement, amendment, and correction.”104 She 
goes on: 
Some “truths” . . . seem to confirm the view that truth does exist 
(it must; these things are true) if only I could find it . . . . The 
problem is the human inclination to make this list of “truths” too 
long, to be too uncritical of its contents, and to defend it too 
harshly and dogmatically. Positionality [the word she coined to 
describe her approach] reconciles the existence of reliable, 
experience-based grounds for assertions of truth . . . with the need 
to question and improve these grounds.105 
It is here that religiously-grounded morality presents a 
conceptually more challenging context. To the certain 
believer, certainty does not inhere only in questions of the 
sort that Geertz calls “world-views,” how reality is put 
together.106 Those views accredit with like certainty 
 
developing a position consistent with (although different from) that taken in the 
text, see Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Theory and Abortion, 20 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 223 (1991). 
104. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 
883-84 (1990). 
105. Id. 
106. See supra text  accompanying note 34. 
Copyright © 2007 by Buffalo Law Review
926 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
 
epistemological premises about the truth of moral 
principles, however “uncritically” embraced or many in 
number.107 A believer asked to accept the “justification” for 
contrary beliefs will experience the request as demanding 
more than simple humility.108 
Yet the one seeking to engage a moral question from a 
different faith tradition, or from none, cannot be expected to 
find Bartlett‟s admonition against speaking “too harshly 
and dogmatically” sufficiently put aside. I do not know a 
way out of this impasse. 
(v) Finally, moral realism is not inconsistent with a 
commitment to pluralism in social policy. It unnecessarily 
gives credence to the rhetoric of anti-relativism to assert a 
relativist morality—“it is all relative,” or “it is just your 
opinion”—in responding to a moral claim one rejects, when 
the response in actuality would be that the claim either has 
no moral valence or is in fact immoral.109 Anti-anti-
relativism can therefore properly espouse a (limited) form of 
anti-relativism of its own, but without the rhetorical fervor 
that often accompanies objections to relativism. Our society 
is quick to treat the assertion that another is in error as on 
(or over) the edge of a required tolerance for diverse 
 
107. See, for example, the many moral precepts contained in the 613 
mitzvot (incumbent obligations) of Orthodox Judaism or the 2865 paragraphs 
of the Roman Catechism. 
108. It  would be a play on words for a Protestant Christian to respond, “I 
am „justified‟ by faith, not by respect for persons who lack it (although I have 
that),” but the response would have appropriate salience nonetheless. 
109. An example of the former is, in my judgment, an objection to 
homosexual sex: whatever the undeniable moral significance of much sexual 
activity, I see no basis for regarding the sex of one‟s partner as a morally salient 
factor. An example of the latter (a morally grounded position that is itself 
immoral) is the exclusion of homosexuals from access to various benefits 
available to heterosexuals in analogous relationships. Of course, these examples 
are highly contestable; suffice it to say that I believe that homosexual sex is not 
per se immoral, whether the contrary belief is justified or not, and that seeking 
to bring about a legal response based on moral condemnation of homosexuality 
is an immoral act. For some “pointing” discussions (all religiously grounded), 
see RICHARD B. HAYS, THE MORAL V ISION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 400 (1996); 
John B. Cobb, Jr., Being Christian About Homosexuality, in HOMOSEXUALITY 
AND CHRISTI AN FAITH 89 (Walter Wink ed., 1999); Jeffrey Stout, How Charity 
Transcends the Culture Wars, 31 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 169 (2003). However, this 
is not the place to argue the correctness of my beliefs, for their truth or falsity 
has nothing to do with relativism, whether dragged into the debate by one side 
or the other. 
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viewpoints.110 To disagree is not intolerance (although one 
can be intolerant in disagreement). To say that you are 
wrong is not to attempt to silence you (although it might be 
expressed in such a way, or lead to such an attempt). To 
respond to a moral avowal by shifting the focus from a 
challenge to its correctness to a relativist claim is the 
converse of the failing of the anti-relativist. If a red herring 
is thrown into your fishing pail, (a fortiori, if you find 
yourself having thrown one in111) don‟t proceed to examine 
it; throw it overboard. 
CONCLUSION 
According to a rabbinical interpretation, the Lord said to Moses: 
“Wherever you see the trace of man, there I stand before you . . . .” 
When engaged in a conversation with a person of different 
religious commitment I discover that we disagree in matters 
sacred to us, “does the image of God I face disappear? Does God 
cease to stand before me?”  
 
Abraham Joshua Heschel112 
In considering the destructive force of conclusory or 
triumphalist dismissals of opposing positions with the label 
“relativism,” I seek more than the elimination from the 
conversation of a diversion. Greater acknowledgment of the 
fact that important controversies in contemporary society 
 
110. For two eloquent and troubled accounts of this phenomenon among 
students, see generally Kay Haugaard, Suspending Moral Judgment: Students 
Who Refuse to Condemn the Unthinkable, CHRON. HIGHE R ED., June 27, 1997, at 
B4; Robert L. Simon, The Paralysis of „Absolutophobia‟, CHRON. HIGHE R ED., 
supra, at B5, (“Discussion of moral issues need not consist of two fanatics 
asserting conflicting principles they regard as self-evident; it can involve 
dialogue, the consideration of the points raised by others, and an admission of 
fallibility on all sides.”). These essays are excerpted in GOODMAN & LESNICK , 
supra note 46, at 107-11). 
111. I owe to Ed Hartnett my belated realization that a relativist response 
is plainly far more widespread in contemporary society than my passing 
parenthetical admonition implies. How much greater, what accounts for its 
appeal, and why I believe that my critique of anti-relativist talk nonetheless 
retains its salience, are complex questions, which for better or worse I do not 
address here. 
112. ABRAHAM JOSHUA HES CHEL , No Religion is an Island, in NO RELIGION IS 
AN ISLAND : ABRAHAM  JOSHUA HESCHEL AND INTERRELIGIOUS DI ALOGUE 8 (Harold 
Kasimov & Roger Sherwin eds., 1991). 
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are a product of a diversity of justifiably held discernments 
of moral truth can prompt efforts to enhance: 
- apprehension of the need to articulate the 
epistemological bases of one‟s beliefs; 
- self-awareness about expressions that cross the 
frontier between justified belief and certainty; 
- openness to the possibility that incompatible beliefs 
(though strongly believed to be in error) may nonetheless be 
justified; and 
- resistance toward the temptation to caricature 
opposing positions, and to demonize those who hold them. 
To the extent that all that happens,113 disagreement 
will surely persist, perhaps not even be lessened in extent. 
It would be naive to presume otherwise. However, it is not 
beyond hope to look toward a lessening of its intensity and 
hostility, and a greater recognition of the compatibility 
between a proper continuing assertion of what one believes 
to be the Truth and a genuine (yet bounded) receptivity to 
pluralism in the setting of social policy.114 
 
 
113. Cathleen Kaveny bases her response to the Encyclical, Evangelium 
Vitae, in significant part on the dual assertion that “many women who 
consider access to abortion to be a fundamental aspect of their freedom are 
epistemically justified although tragically wrong in this belief.” Kaveny, supra 
note 79, at 146. 
114. David Hollenbach has written a marvelously rich, sophisticated, 
thought-provoking—and heartening—study of the contours , possibilities, and 
importance of what he terms “intellectual solidarity” in “a community of 
freedom.” DAVID HOLLE NBACH, THE COMMON GOOD AND CHRISTI AN ETHI CS 
(2002). 
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